Disciplinary Promiscuity[1] and its Discontents[2]

Philosophy enlarges the mind of an architect, frees him from arrogance, and renders him courteous, just and faithful.

—Vitruvius, De Architettura, Book I

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INTRODUCTION

Both Architecture and Philosophy tend to appropriate and contaminate fields other than their own; philosophers have the capacity to turn everything into a philosophical problem, and architects similarly tend to appropriate issues and frame them as architectural concerns. Running parallel to the tendency of disciplinary exchange is, in actuality, an increasing suspicion of cross-breeding among disciplines, and an almost anxious attitude from those who -perhaps not wrongly- feel threatened by external forces pushing onto their domain. While this apparent promiscuity seems to have been remarkably beneficial on a number of fronts, it also raises many difficult questions about the integrity of each discipline, their standing in history, and their current specific engagement in society.

There is an increasing interest in philosophy by architects, and also by philosophers in architecture.[3] Yet there is also an underlying belief that architecture and philosophy deal with entirely different realms of competency; architecture is generally understood as a material practice resulting in the construction of buildings experienced through our bodily sensations, and philosophy as the discipline engaged with thought and knowledge. While not altogether false, these conceptions fall into the very restrictive framework of duality, paralleling the old mind-body dichotomy, from which it is very difficult to find a way forward.

The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework within which to question and re-conceptualize the relationship between the two disciplines that will not place them in opposition to one another. As a means to set up the problem, in the first part of this paper we will contrapose two different contemporary views regarding the problem of disciplinary exchange; one from an architect, Patrik Schumacher, and the other from a philosopher, Simon Critchley. The second part will introduce the theory that will serve as a new framework for dispelling dichotomies and uncovering novel possibilities of interaction, namely assemblage theory, as first introduced by Gilles Deleuze and further developed by contemporary philosopher Manuel DeLanda. The third part of the paper will use assemblage theory to tie these viewpoints into a coherent conceptual framework.

CONTEMPORARY PROVOCATIONS

We may be able to gain some insight into the relationship between architecture and philosophy by discussing the viewpoints of two contemporary and acutely provocative figures. One is a practicing architect, who is an outspoken defender of architecture's autonomous nature, Patrik Schumacher. The other is a practicing philosopher actively engaged in what he calls "disciplinary promiscuity" while holding the title of *Philosopher* in a number of academic and nonacademic circles, Simon Critchley. Both are practicing in their field and engaged in academia;[4] and both have provocative positions on how their respective disciplines should engage and be engaged by others.

An Architect's provocation: Patrik Schumacher

Schumacher purports to have developed a new framework for architecture that does not need anything that can't be produced within architecture itself. For him, architecture is a distinct subsystem of society that can be theorized as its own system of communication through what he calls "self-production", a term interrelated to autopoiesis"[5]; the theory he appropriates from Niklas Luhmann a German sociologist, and a prominent thinker in systems theory. Systems of communications are autopoietic when they can be defined as a system that reproduces itself; that keeps itself going. The essential characteristic of an autopoietic system is a circular organization that reproduces all its specific components out of its own life-process.

For Schumacher the theory of autopoiesis as applied to architecture offers a coherent framework that allows architecture to present itself as a discipline with its own unique logic, able to be compared with other subsystems of society like art, science and politics, while maintaining complete independence from them:

> "the theory insists on the necessity of disciplinary autonomy and argues for a sharp demarcation from both art and science. Design intelligence is an intelligence sui generis. It is a specific collective intelligence that evolves within its own self-referential network of communications. This network is the autopoiesis of architecture."[6]

Therefore his theory for architecture as autopoiesis can encompass many modes of communication; a network that comes in the form of built work, drawings and texts.[7] However, while the source of inspiration for this theory actually lies outside of architecture, from appropriated concepts, it insists on architecture's autonomy from other disciplines. While some might find it paradoxical, Schumacher doesn't see the adoption as compromising architecture's independence. In his words: "the importation of new ideas is necessary to the vitality of any discourse." Yet, he continues: "It's declared audience is the discipline of architecture itself."[8]

A Philosopher's provocation: Simon Critchley

In contrast, Critchley is an avid defender of disciplinary promiscuity. When asked about interdisciplinary collaboration, Critchley brings up the existence of a fairly obscure group of which he is the head philosopher called the *International Necronautical Society* (INS). They speak of their undertaking as "contemporary intellectual follies".

> "We are a semi-fictitious avant-garde group based on the model of the European avant-gardes. We work collaboratively, on various projects, texts, pranks, activities. What interests me about collaboration is working in a less inhibited way. It just gives a different meaning to authorship. You know, academia is, for the most part, radically individualistic."

For Critchley the avant-garde is associated, as it should be, with working in the margins, with doing "pranks, activities". He is interested and engaged with things that may not immediately seem as pertaining to a particular discipline but that try to bridge and question and often exist in the fringes or mostly in obscurity. He quotes Foucault in having the need to: "develop

your legitimate strangeness". Interdisciplinary collaboration can help provoke that sense of estrangement; the sense of uncanny familiarity can extracts us out of the domain we may have grown accustomed and dependent on. In his words:

> "we're trying to feel our way toward: the breach, the sudden, epiphanic emergence of the genuinely unplanned, the departure from the script. To put it in fashionable Badiouan, the Event. The INS believes in the Event—in the power of the event, and that of art, to carry that event within itself: bring it to pass, or hold it in abeyance, as potentiality. And, paradoxically, the best way that art can do this is by allowing itself to be distracted, gazing in the rear view mirror."[9]

Critchley, claims to see no reason why disciplines should be named and divided the way they are, and he says that Philosophy is the worst example of that. "I mean, what is philosophy? Professional philosophy is simply the activity that a certain number of professional philosophers decide is philosophy."[10] Critchley goes further, and claims that he would actually be in favor of not even thinking in terms of individual disciplines. The philosophy he claims to find most interesting is that which is read by people in all sorts of disciplines:

> "There are pools of interesting things right? And it's interesting to swim in those pools. And you might find other fish, other species. You can talk to them. Talk, whatever fish do. (...) Innovation has always come through forms of intellectual promiscuity. You learn things in the oddest ways, from people that you just didn't expect to. It means having your ears open, and not being judgmental of it."[11]

Motivations and discontents: role of academia and practice

Both Schumacher and Critchley seem to have innovation as the goal for their respective process, yet the ways they believe one might arrive to innovation are completely different. For Schumacher one need not look outside of one's own discipline but rather question the norm and push innovation within its own competency; for Critchley it is quite the opposite, only delving into disciplinary exchange can one arrive at true innovation within a discipline. Given such opposing viewpoints, one might wonder what the motivations are in either case. It is certainly not the case that architecture has less capacity for disciplinary exchange and philosophy more; rather, Schumacher and Critchley are motivated by discontents fueled by pressures inside and outside of their respective disciplines. However while infused with their own motivations, these are far from being purely subjective positions; these two perspectives are instrumental in setting up the larger problem at stake.

In Schumacher's case what motivates his motto of architecture as an autonomous discipline, is his discontentedness with the political and social expectations he claims are being artificially placed on the *practice* of architecture.[12] He is known to be particularly critical of the "politically correct" role that architects are being asked to fulfill with their work. He sees this as a conservative and moralizing imposition that stunts creative exploration and innovation. For him, social justice is not part of the competency of the architect: "Architects are in charge of the form of the built environment, not its content."[13]

While appropriating theories from other disciplines might strike one as an example of disciplinary promiscuity (which is precisely what Schumacher is charging against) Schumacher does this in answer to his *discontent* and in service of *innovation*. He claims that theoretical sources of inspiration can lie outside of architecture without compromising its autonomy as a discipline. What he emphasizes is that autopoiesis implies that: "architecture does not accept any outside authority with respect to architectural matters."[14] His use of autopoiesis for architecture appears thus to be motivated by a discontent with what he sees as restrictive pressures placed on the practice of architecture by forces -political and other- external to it.

In Critchley's case one might wonder what the need is to engage with the "semi-fictitious avant-garde group" given that he has an established position within the established structure of academia. Interestingly, he has repeatedly mentioned that most decisions and motivations behind the things that we do begin with discontent, or in his words "disappointment". Philosophy itself, he contends, starts with a disappointment with the state of affairs of the world.[15] He has also repeatedly commented on the overly individualistic nature of philosophy within academia, which he sees as detrimental to the education and preparedness of students to engage with the world. It seems that the motivation behind Critchley's push towards collaboration and avid defense of *disciplinary promiscuity* is rooted in a deep discontent with the current structure of what he sees as an overly individualistic and solitary academic structure within philosophy. Critchley seems to be finding his outlet in the practice of philosophy as extended into what he calls "paraphilosophy", which is encompassing of work outside of the purely philosophical.

On the other hand, while avidly defending disciplinary promiscuity, Critchley is aware that the tools of the philosopher are still the ones he will fall back on while aiming to move outside of Philosophy towards interdisciplinary collaboration: "what I learned from Derrida very early on is that the step outside philosophy always falls back within the orbit of that which it tries to exceed. Not to philosophize is still to philosophize."[16]

ASSEMBLAGES AND ITS THEORY

In the light of the controversial and provocative viewpoints sketched thus far, in this section we will explore a way of moving beyond the dichotomy of *either* complete autonomy (Schumacher) or full promiscuity (Critchley). The aim here is to setup a framework for a new model of conceptualizing disciplinary relationships. This model requires introducing the origins of *assemblages* as first presented by Gilles Deleuze, and its developments into a theory in its own right by Manuel DeLanda.

Origins: Deleuze's assemblage, Hegel's totalities

Loosely defined from systems theory, *assemblages* can be thought of as coherent bits of a system whose components can be completely pulled out of one system, plugged into another, and continue to co-function as a whole. Assemblages have a certain level of independence from each component part, yet each part is co-functioning as part of what seems to be a coherent whole. However, Deleuze had a very particular understanding of the term[17] and used it, albeit sporadically, as a major concept that he returns to throughout his publications.[18] For him an assemblage, far from being a mere collection, it is a dynamic coming together of disparate things that form a union for a particular co-functioning. This union could change, and form new relations with different components; they can form different assemblages.

Manuel DeLanda believes that Deleuze created the concept of assemblage as a counterpart to the Hegelian idea of totality, which in turn was aiming to resolve some of the dichotomies latent in Kant's philosophical system. A totality in the Hegelian sense is defined as the processes by which disparate and unrelated phenomena are understood in connection with a larger complex: a *totality*. Hegel's totalities are holistic perspectives that aim to reconcile opposites and unify fragmented or alienated forms and practices. The parts of the whole cannot be reduced to the sum of the parts because the parts fuse together to form a seamless whole, a seamless totality. In this conception wholes have an inextricable unity where the parts are kept together by properties that are internal to them. Hegel defends this conception and contraposes it to what he calls a mechanism:

> "This is what constitutes the character of a mechanism, namely that whatever relation obtains between the things combined, this relation is extraneous to them that does not

ENDNOTES

1. This term "disciplinary promiscuity" which seems to be quite in use lately, was first made explicit to me in a lecture class given collaboratively by Simon Critchley Clive Dilnot called "*Thinking the Present*". When asked about the nature of inter-disciplinary collaboration Critchley responded emphatically that "*disciplinary promiscuity is the only way forward*".

2. The reference here is to Freud's "Civilization and its Discontents". In this short book Freud discusses his more general view on man's role in the world, which he sees in terms of an ongoing conflict between the individual and the demands of society on that individual. "Civilization is only made possible by individual renouncement". The title is thus making a provocative allusion that *disciplinary promiscuity* is only possible by the renouncement of the individual discipline.

3. A number of interdisciplinary conferences have emerged in the last few years; "Philosophy+ Architecture" conference held twice at Boston University, and many others including the one for which this paper was written: "Architecture is Philosophy: Beyond the Post-Critical" part of ACSA's annual meeting in 2016: *Shaping New Knowledges*.

4. Schumacher co-directs the Advanced Design Research Lab at the Architectural Association in London and is tenured professor at Innsbruck University; Critchley is professor and ex-chair of the department of Philosophy at the New School For Social Research in New York.

5. *Autopoiesis* is a term coined by evolutionary biologists Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela in 1972 to describe self-generating and self-maintain biological systems such as cells. Cell division, mitosis, is often given as an example of a process of an autopoetic system. The concept of autopoesis was adapted to social systems theory by Niklas Luhmann, and was subsequently applied to different disciplines such as Economics (Bob Jessop), Business (Marjatta Maula) law (Gunther Teubner).

6. Patrik Schumacher, *The Autopoiesis of Architecture*, p.2

7. However, for a particular work to enter the autopoiesis of architecture and form part of this system he has defined, Schumacher contends that it must be attributable to a named architect/author and his/her work. If there is no single person who can be claimed as the author there "must be an architect or architectural theorists that poses as the spokes-person and point of reference for this particular vernacular building/tradition." This is partly why he provocatively claims that the discipline of architecture as he has framed it only really started at the Renaissance when it becomes possible to discern an author behind great architectural works through the preservation of drawings and architectural representations.

8. Patrik Schumacher, *The Autopoiesis of Architecture*, p.8

9. Simon Critchley interview: "An Interview with a Collaborator" Canon. *The Interdisciplinary Journal of The New School for Social Research*

10. Simon Critchley interview: "An Interview with a Collaborator" Canon. *The Interdisciplinary Journal of The New School for Social Research*

11. Critchley interview: "An Interview with a Collaborator" Canon. *The Interdisciplinary Journal of The New School for Social Research*.

12. However Schumacher adopts a broader definition of architecture as encompassing of other related disciplines, interior design, landscape, etc. There is also the use of "theory" in his definition of architecture (as opposed to just *building*), while claiming that architectural theory is a different autonomous discipline from architecture. So it appears that there are some inconsistencies and that his contention is not always as strict as he claims. The definition of architecture as autopoiesis seems to expand and contract as needed, one might claim (as has been done by his critics) that he is not as rigorous as he sets out to be.

13. Interview with Dezeen: http://www.dezeen.com/2014/03/18/architecture-not-art-patrik-schumacher-venice-architecturebiennale-rant/

14. Patrik Schumacher, *The Autopoiesis of Architecture*, p.2

15. In an interview with Jill Stauffer, Critchley says: "There are lots of stories about how philosophy begins. Some people claim it begins in wonder; some people claim it begins in worry. I claim it begins in disappointment."

16. *3:am Magazine*: "Writing outside philosophy: an interview with simon critchley" interviewed by Andrew Gallix.

17. The English term *assemblage* is used by Brian Massumi in his English translation of Deleuze and Guattari's French word *agencement*, which can actually encompass a range of meanings depending on the context, such as: to layout, order, arrange, combine, fit, etc.

18. Including those he co-wrote with Guattari, like *A Thousand Plateaus*. However, Deleuze and Guattari did not want to unify the versions of their respective theories of things and as a result, there are actually two different versions of assemblages in the seminal works they co-authored, one held by Deleuze and the other by Guattari. Here, I will focus on a third version, developed more in depth by contemporary philosopher, Manuel DeLanda, who takes mostly from Deleuze but tries to reconcile the differences first by smoothening out the inconsistencies and then by actually developing the theory in his own unique way which at times departs from the original brush strokes given by Deleuze himself. DeLanda is actually criticized for doing this by Ian Buchanan in "Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents", but in doing it and connecting it to Sociality (in *A New Philosophy of Society*) he gives a new future to the theory.

19. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Logic of Science,* Vol.2, Book 2, p.711

20. Manuel DeLanda, *A New Philosophy of Society*, p.10

21. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, p.69

concern their nature at all and even if it is accompanied by semblance of unity it remains nothing more than composition, mixture, aggregation, and the like."[19]

While sharing the characteristic of not being reduced to their parts with totalities, assemblages differ in that they can never form a seamless whole. In totalities:

> "The component parts are constituted by the very relations they have to other parts of the whole. A part detached from such a whole ceases to be what it is, since being this particular part is one of the constitutive properties. A whole in which the component parts are self-subsistent and their relations are external to each other does not possess an organic unity."[20]

It seems that both Hegel and Deleuze were invested in elaborating a theory that would allow them to move past dichotomies and provide a new way of framing relations between components. But while totalities worked as an encompassing framework for Hegel, they seemed unsatisfactory to Deleuze. Assemblages are what for Deleuze fulfilled that role.

Characteristics of assemblages: heterogeneity and relations of exteriority

An important characteristic of assemblages is the heterogeneity of the component parts; an assemblage is first and foremost what keeps heterogeneous elements together. In his interviews with Claire Parnet, Deleuze provides one of the clearest definitions of the term as he conceived it:

> "What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns--different natures. Thus, the assemblage's only unity is that of co-functioning."[21]

As we have seen, another defining characteristic of assemblages is the type of relationship that its parts can hold. What Deleuze calls assemblages are wholes characterized by *relations of exteriority*. These relations imply that the component parts of the whole—of the assemblage—may be detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which the interactions are different. Thus the component parts of an assemblage are self-subsistent and have certain autonomy to form relations that can change. In other words, relations of exteriority imply that the properties of the component parts can never explain the relations which constitute the whole. The parts maintain their properties so that they can be separated and plugged into different assemblages.

On the other hand, *relationships of Interiority* are things held together with the properties of each part fusing into one another so that they cannot be separated once they have joined. This is Hegel's concept of *totality* described earlier: the relationships between the parts constitute the identity of the parts related and the properties themselves are defined by the interactions.[22]

Emergence: properties and capacities

For something to qualify as an assemblage its parts have to do more than form a mere collection. An assemblage *emerges* when we have these conditions: first, the components of an assemblage come together in such a way that the assemblage is not reducible to the sum of its parts; second, it has properties of its own that do not call back the properties of the constituting parts: it has emergent properties. In other words, something has *emergent* properties if it cannot be explained by looking at its component parts. *Emergence*[23] is the term often used to describe this phenomenon.[24]

Assemblages function as a whole whose components can be extracted out of one system, inserted into another, and still work. As such, assemblages characteristically have functional capacities but do not have a singular function—that is, they are not designed to only do one

thing. They have the capacity to function differently if assembled with different parts. The reason why the whole cannot be reduced to its parts is because the properties of the whole are not made up of the aggregation of properties of its parts. Rather, the whole emerges from exercising the capacity of each part. This capacity, while dependent on its properties, is not reducible to them. In assemblages, the parts retain the properties of the parts, even though their interactions change. As Deleuze puts it: "a relation may change without the terms changing."[25] The interactions change because the capacity of the component parts is actualized. Thus property and capacity are not interchangeable; the interaction of the parts generates capacities that are defined by the interactions, but the properties themselves are not defined by the interactions.[26]

ARCHITECTURE AND PHILOSOPHY AS SOCIAL ASSEMBLAGES

The strongest appeal of assemblage theory is that it allows us to move beyond dichotomies. As we have seen, assemblages are *emergent* entities that have the potential to combine with others to produce even larger assemblages. Architecture and philosophy can be conceived as such assemblages.[27] While they have their own modes of expressivity (their own properties) they are made up of interacting parts that can enter into relation with one another to form part of a larger *social* assemblage. If conceived through assemblage theory, architecture and philosophy can co-function without losing their unique specificity, and forming an assemblage with emergent properties that cannot be explained by merely looking at the constituting parts. Something more than the sum of its parts emerges from this co-functioning. But what is this "*more*"? What is the appeal of philosophy for architects and vice versa the appeal of architecture for philosophers?

Modes of expressivity

Architecture and philosophy have distinct modes of expression and communication. Language is the material through which philosophical competency is mostly expressed.[28] And while architecture also uses language, its unique mode of communication is mostly non-linguistic. Some might argue that drawing is the defining competency of architecture, while others might claim it to be the built architectural artifact; however its specific and unique mode of expression is mostly agreed on as being predominantly non-linguistic.

Interestingly, Schumacher gives philosophy a special position as the discipline where he sees "the most advanced patterns of communication are drawn together, abstracted, systematized and disseminated back into the various specialist discourses that in turn might be able to incorporate equivalent advances into their respective discourses."[29] However he insists that this doesn't give philosophy authority over architecture, rather it: "makes philosophy a very useful resource for architectural theoreticians" who can then contribute back from within architecture with what remains "exclusively addressed to architects."[30]

Philosophy gives a linguistic mode of communication to architecture that not only complement it, but rather *augment* it. It is not a new idea that theory has played an important role in architecture. For Schumacher, it is indeed theory that distinguishes architecture from mere building[31] but this comes to us from much longer ago, with Vitruvius' treatise *De Architettura* which is founded on the principal of architecture as both theory (ratiocinatio) and practice (fabrica)[32]. Interestingly there is a clear interdisciplinarity to architecture as defined by Vitruvius where he claims that: "The knowledge of the architect is furnished with many disciplines and various kinds of learning."[33] Vitruvius continues: "Philosophy enlarges the mind of an architect, frees him from arrogance, and renders him courteous, just and faithful."[34]

While architects might not achieve the same levels of depth in philosophical issues, Philosophy can give depth and layers to architectural thought and practice that makes its appeal self-evident. But what is the appeal of architecture for philosophers? The key is in

22. An example of a seamless totality in Hegel's time is the organism of the body. Even though now we know we can take parts out of the body and it can still be kept alive; at the time it seemed that all the component parts of the body were in some way fused together to make this seamless totality which is the human body. From this seamless totality it was believes that we could not take anything out without jeopardizing the integrity, or even the existence, of the whole.21. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, p.69

23. Emergence can be illustrated with the example of patterns in cellular automata, which are often considered the paradigm example of emergence in recent complex systems theory. From the repetition of a simple rule, unexpected complex high-level patterns emerge. In this paper we will use the notion of something being emergent if it cannot be explained by looking at its component parts. There is some skepticism with emergence, mostly because at the time when the concept was developing, it was not clearly understood how it could be that combining two or more things would produce something with new properties that are not in the originating components. In fact in British 'emergentism' of the early twentieth century it was believed that emergent properties should be mysterious and unexplainable, which is why emergence was rejected by analytic philosophers. Thus a cloud of obscurity and mysteriousness surrounded the concepts, and probably still exists today.

24. While emergence is not used explicitly in Deleuze, DeLanda claims that its concept is implied. The origins of the word, as used in the context of assemblage theory, can be traced to John Stuart Mill in discussing the chemical reaction between hydrogen and oxygen. When combined to generate water, we can see that water has properties that neither hydrogen nor oxygen have on their own; it has emergent properties. As Stuart Mill explains: "The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties different from those of either of the two substances separately, or both of them taken together. Not a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is observable in those of their compound, water." John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*.

25. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, p. 55

26. DeLanda explains: "we can distinguish , for example, the properties of a given entity from the capacities to interact with other entities. While properties are given and may be denumerable as a closed list, its capacities are not given—they may go unexercised if no entity suitable for interaction is around. (…) being part of a whole involves the exercise of a part's capacities but it is not a constitutive property of it. And given that

an unexercised capacity does not affect what a component is, a part may be detached from the whole while preserving its identity." (Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society, p10). To further elucidate the distinction between a property and a capacity in assemblage theory we can turn to the example given by Manuel DeLanda of a knife; a knife has a series of easy to describe properties, such as being sharp, shiny

or heavy, but it also has capacities that need to be exercised in order to become actual. In his words: "A capacity is only actual in the process of being exercised: that is, when a knife is actually cutting something. Capacities are different from properties in that capacities are always relational. The capacity to cut can only be exercised in inter-action with another body, which in turn had the capacity of being cut." (Manuel DeLanda, *Material Evolvability and Variability* p.12) Thus, capaci-ties are always relational and imply a coupled system: the capacity to affect (cut) must always be coupled with a capacity to be affected (being cut)

27. See DeLanda's book: *A New Philosophy of Society*

28. Alain Badiou has aimed to find alternatives to the hegemony of language in Philosophy, wanting to reverse "the absorption of philosophy into the mediation of language", stating that "language is not the absolute horizon of thought." But he also acknowledges that "language always constitutes what can be called the historical matter of truth and of Philosophy" *Infinite Thought*, p. 37

29. Patrik Schumacher, *The Autopoiesis of Architecture*,.p.9

30. Ibid.

31. "Only theoretically informed building design constitutes architecture" Patrik Schumacher, *The Autopoiesis of Architecture*, p.36

32. The translation of "fabrica" as practice and "ratiocination" as theory is taken from the transla-tion by W. Newton. For theory Vitruvious means: "the knowledge of the proportions, forms, distributions or the parts of a building and their effects, so as to be able to design or compose with judgment."

33. Vitruvius I.I.I, quoted in Kagis McEwen, p330

34. Vitruvius, Book I, p3

35. Patrik Schumacher, *The Autopoiesis of Architecture*, p.3. Importantly it does not mean that it has to be built for it to have the power of non-linguistic material expressivity; drawings and visual representations as modes of communica-tion also have this potential.

36. by the emergent properties

37. Gilles Deleuze, *What is Philosophy*? p.12

38. Goodshild, *Gilles Deleuze and the Question of Philosophy* p.152. Goodshild also criticizes Deleeuze for this claiming that it is a narrow focus that " limits the exploratory lines of philosophy, for they must always return to the plane of concepts."

39. Gilles Deleuze, *What is Philosophy*? p.205

the *expressivity*. What architecture can give philosophers is also a different mode of expres-sivity that is non-linguistic; experiencing another way of communicating ideas- a way of materializing them with other means that are not reliant on the written or spoken word. The non-linguistic expressivity specific to architecture is a powerful manifestation of ideas that can make it an appealing complement to linguistic expressivity. In Schumacher's words:

> "Although buildings/spaces are just one of the many types of architectural communi-cations, they are privileged within architecture. Completed buildings/spaces constitute architecture's specific contribution to society. They are communications through which architecture stimulates all the other communication systems."[35]

Disciplinary promiscuity, what is the appeal?

Using the theory of assemblages as a way of looking at the world is at once liberating and invigorating yet profoundly unsettling. It implies that systems have an appearance of being coherent and stable, yet they are made of parts that could be extracted at any time without breaking the integrity of that system. The debate between architecture as a material practice and philosophy as intellectual one can be reframed using assemblage theory in order to move beyond the impasse that dualities instill. Assemblage theory is a potentially sturdy framework to start to understand the relationship between architecture and philosophy as not just one formed by complementary modes of expression, but as disciplines with their own specificity, which have component parts that can interact with one another without disturbing the integ-rity of the discipline itself. Something else emerges from the intermingling of architecture and philosophy, but it is not a hybrid discipline; one is still as an architect using the tools of the architect, or a philosopher engaged with the materials of philosophy, yet augmented by what emerges from the intermingling and co-functioning of the two.[36]

Deleuze defines philosophy in terms of concepts: "knowledge through pure concepts."[37] Hence he is defining philosophy by something that is specific to philosophy and distinguishes it from science and art in terms of its material. [38] Far from being a narrow focus, while he advocates a return to the material of philosophy he also finds it key to look at philosophy through the notion of non-philosophy, which resembles Critchley's interdisciplinary outlook discussed earlier:

> "the plane of philosophy is pre-philosophical inasmuch as it considers it in itself, inde-pendent of the concepts which come to occupy it, but non-philosophy is found there where the plane confronts chaos. Philosophy requires a non-philosophy which under-stands it."[39]

In other words, in order to understand and operate within our own discipline, Deleuze seems to suggest that we need to look at something outside of it; something which is still capable of comprehending it, but that is not actually a constituent part of it. This might be at the core of what brings this panel together. It is also latent in the appropriation of theories such as autopoiesis or assemblage theory, as well as Simon Critchley's insistence that one must look outside of one's domain, to seek our "legitimate strangeness."

CLOSING REMARKS

The aim of this paper was to re-conceptualize the relationship between the two disciplines of architecture and philosophy in order to move past the dichotomous notions that have fueled contemporary discontents with cross-disciplinary exchange. The scene was set up by using the opposing views of Simon Critchley and Patrik Schumacher and learning from their discontents; an overly individualistic academic structure in philosophy and archaic external impositions placed onto the practice of architecture. Assemblage theory was then introduced and instrumentalized as a possible new framework for this relationship; one that

recognizes that architecture and philosophy have different competencies but importantly architecture is not limited to the experience of our physical body and philosophy not limited to the inner world of thought and the brain. Both disciplines have a strong social dimension with the capacity to enhance one another. As such, architecture does not merely provide physical shelter and protection; understood through philosophy it provides mental mediation between the world and our consciousness; articulating the physical and mental as one.

As we have seen, going outside one's own discipline provides novel ways of acting within it. However that disciplinary promiscuity inevitably makes us fall back into the realm of that which we aim to surpass, as Critchley reminds us: "Not to philosophize is still to philosophize".

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